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ST. JOhN'S LAW REVIEPW
these agreements. 1 4 Unfortunately, however, the refusal to extend the
benefits of CPLR 3213 could be motivated by the fact that this is the
safer approach. For, the denial of a 3213 motion only prolongs the
action; it does not even foreclose a subsequent motion under CPLR
3212.115 Nevertheless, it is anomalous to deny the possibly destitute
spouse the advantages of CPLR 3213 while affording such relief in
commercial transactions."16
CPLR 3216: Service of forty-five day demand by ordinary mail per-
mitted where no prejudice is shown.
One year after joinder of issue, a motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution may be heard, provided that the motion is preceded by
a demand for a note of issue. 1 7 If the note of issue is filed within
forty-five days, all delay is forgiven."i8 However, the failure to comply
with the demand warrants dismissal, either sua sponte or by motion
of the aggrieved party, unless the recalcitrant party exhibits a meri-
torious cause of action and a justifiable excuse for the delay."19 Al-
though dismissal is usually without prejudice' 20 its implications are
obvious if the statute of limitations has run. For, CPLR 205 specifi-
cally excepts a dismissal under GPLR 3216 from its ambit.' 2 '
The imminency of a malpractice suit in the above situation im-
pels familiarity with the exact procedures to be followed; yet, the
constitutional dimensions of CPLR 3216 have pervaded judicial con-
struction of the section. 22 Now that the constitutionality of the sec-
114 See Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 24 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812, cert. denied.
385 U.S. 833 (1966); Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 52 Misc. 2d 437, 275 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1966). See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
115 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary 4, at 832 (1970).
116 Id.
117 CPLR 3216. A condition precedent to the motion is that a year must have elapsed
between the joinder of issue and the hearing date for the motion to dismiss. Hence, CPLR
3216 would seem to sanction a demand for a note of issue served 45 days before the end
of the first year. 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary 16, at 926 (1970).
118 See Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 N.Y.2d 237, 250 N.E.2d 690, 303 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1969).
119 CPLR 3216(e). For a list of the factors that a court should take into consideration
when passing on a 3216 motion, see Sortino v. Fisher, 20 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d
186 (Ist Dep't 1963).
120 CPLR 3216(a). See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentaries 12-13, at 922-25
(1970).
121 CPLR 205 permits the commencement of a new action within six months of ter-
mination despite the fact that the statute of limitations has run. However, it expressly
excepts termination due to a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal for neglect to prose-
cute, or a final judgment on the merits. See 1 WK&M 205.06.
122 See Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 N.Y.2d 237, 250 N.E.2d 690, 803 N.Y.S.2d 68
(1969). For a discussion of the history of CPLR 3216, including amendments and judicial
hostility, see 7B McKINNEYs CPLR 3216, commentaries 1-4, at 910-17 (1970).
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tion has been resolved, courts can focus on interpreting particular
aspects of it. A problem recently posed centered on the efficacy of a
demand for a note of issue which was served by ordinary mail, rather
than by registered or certified mail as required under CPLR 3216.
In Beermont Corp. v. Yager,123 the court found that despite the
irregular mode of service plaintiff's attorney had not been preju-
diced. Consequently, the court granted a motion to dismiss for lack
of prosecution because a note of issue was not served within forty-five
days, and the attorney's sole excuse was a busy schedule, which is not
considered a justification for a denial of the motion. Moreover, the
court took notice of the five-year lapse between defendant's demand
for a bill of particulars and the appellant's compliance therewith.
Since the attorney in Beermont was not prejudiced by the irreg-
ular service, the court was justified in granting the motion to dis-
miss. 124 For, the demand did, in fact, serve its basic purpose: it ap-
prised the attorney of his situation. And, the irregular service was
not, in any event, related to the failure to file a note of issue within
forty-five days. Hence, exacting compliance with the service require-
ments by the defendant was not mandated. Conversely, a slight delay
by an attorney while attempting to comply with the demand should
also be overlooked.125
CPLR 5004: Conflict over legal rate of interest continues.
CPLR 5004 prescribes that "interest shall be paid at the legal
rate." This rate, which is set under section 5-501 of the General Ob-
ligations Law126 had traditionally been a flat 6 percent. An amend-
ment to section 5-501,127 however, authorized the Banking Board to
adjust the rate of interest "upon the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or things in action." Accordingly, during February
of 1969, the Board adopted the maximum rate of interest of 7.5 per-
cent.128
Without a specific declaration of legislative intent, the courts
had to determine the effect, if any, of the Board's action upon the
123 34 App. Div. 2d 589, 808 N.Y.S.2d 109 (3d Dep't 1970).
124 See CPLR 2001.
125 For example, where local court rules have thwarted an otherwise diligent effort
to procure a note of issue, an extension should be permitted without requiring the plain-
tiff to exhibit that his previous delay was justifiable. 73 MCKINNEY's CPLR 3216, com-
mentary 26, at 934 (1970).
126 N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 1964).
127 Id. (McKinney supp. 1968).
128 See 3 NYCRR 34.1 (1969).
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